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ASSESSING MODERN BANKRUPTCY LAW:
AN EXAMPLE OF JUSTICE*
Veryl Victoria Miles**
Earthly power doth then show likest God's when mercy
seasons justice.1
I. INTRODUCTION
One might measure the success of a law only by how well
the law achieves the objectives of its creators. Of course, this
approach will be guided solely by the vision and values of the
creators, which may not necessarily include greater values of
justice, mercy, and charity. Accordingly, a more meaningful,
challenging, and enlightened measurement of the success of a
law would be to assess how effectively it serves the notions of
social justice.
Social justice, as we learn from the writings of Aristotle
in the Nicomachean Ethics, is "the summary of all Virtue"2 -
complete and supreme. We achieve this justice by the way we
respond to the concerns of others through our laws; that is,
the concerns and needs of the community to which we be-
long.3 The actions and conduct of men and women in relation
to one another and the laws that are created to regulate the
* The title is derived from a section in John Finnis' book Natural Law
and Natural Rights, titled "An Example of Justice: Bankruptcy." JOHN FiNNIs,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 188-97 (1980).
** Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Colum-
bus School of Law. This article is based on a lecture the author presented as
the 1995 Mirror of Justice Scholar at the Columbus School of Law. Professor
Miles would like to acknowledge her appreciation of the Guild of Catholic Law-
yers at the Columbus School of Law for their support and encouragement, and
give thanks to Professor William Wagner and Ms. Francine Rosenberger for
their comments.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
2. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 137-38 (J.E.C.
Welldon, D.D. trans., MacMillan 1934) (1892) (footnotes omitted).
3. Id. In the words of Aristotle:
Justice... is complete virtue although not complete in an absolute
sense, but in relation to one's neighbours. Hence it is that justice is
often regarded as the supreme virtue, "more glorious than the star of
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conduct of the members of a community can be defined as
"just" or "unjust." Whether a law is "just" or "unjust" is based
on how laws serve the common good of the greater commu-
nity that is affected by such laws.4 Aristotle identified this
notion of justice as general justice.
In addition to this definition of "general justice," Aristotle
identified another concept of justice that he called "particular
justice."5 Particular justice is a concept that is quantitative
in nature and is premised upon concepts of equity and fair-
ness. The equity and fairness that embodies Aristotle's par-
ticular justice is defined as "distributive justice" and "correc-
tive justice."7 Distributive justice anticipates each person
receiving their due share or proportionate share of the whole,
as determined by one's contribution to the whole or what one
is entitled to receive from the whole by right.8 Whereas cor-
eve or dawn;" or as the proverb runs "Justice is the summary of all
Virtue."
It is in the highest sense complete virtue, as being an exercise of
complete virtue. It is complete too, because he who possesses it can
employ his virtue in relation to his neighbours and not merely by him-
self; for there are many people who are capable of exhibiting virtue at
home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbours. Ac-
cordingly there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias that "office
will reveal a man," for one who is in office is at once brought into rela-
tion and association with others. It is this same reason which makes
justice alone of the virtues seem to be the good of others, as it implies a
relation to others, for it promotes the interests of somebody else,
whether he be a ruler or a simple fellow-citizen.
Id.
4. Aristotle defined justice and just laws as laws that:
pronounce upon all subjects with a view to the interest of the commu-
nity as a whole, or of those who are its best or leading citizens whether
in virtue or in any similar sense. Thus one sense in which we use the
term "just" for all that tends to create and to conserve happiness and
the elements of happiness in the body politic.
Id. at 137.
5. Id. at 140-42.
6. Id. at 142-55.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 143. Aristotle explained the concept of distributive justice as:
that which is just is a mean, that it is fair or equal and that it is rela-
tive to certain persons. It follows also that, inasmuch as it is a mean, it
is a mean between certain extremes, viz. excess and defect, and that
inasmuch as it is just, it is relative to certain persons .... For if the
persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares; in fact the
source of battles and complaints is either that people who are equal
have unequal shares, or that people who are not equal have equal
shares, distributed to them. The same truth is clearly seen from the
principle of merit; for everybody admits that justice in distributions is
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rective or commutative justice is purely concerned with
equality from a geometric perspective - each person should
be treated as equal under the law.' Although distributive
and commutative justice call for quantitative measurements
for achieving justice, these concepts of particular justice must
always reflect the "complete virtue" of general justice and be
applied in a manner that reflects concern for the common
good of society. 10
In his book Natural Law and Natural Rights," Profes-
sor John Finnis identified modern bankruptcy law as "an ex-
ample of justice" on the theory that the principles and rules
that underlie modern bankruptcy law embody the Aristote-
lian concepts of distributive and commutative justice.' 2 Pro-
fessor Finnis' illustration of how modern bankruptcy law re-
flects distributive and commutative justice is compelling.
Indeed, it is this comparative assessment of modern bank-
ruptcy law as an example of justice that causes one to wonder
how well our bankruptcy law stands against other more de-
veloped notions of justice.
determined by merit of some sort; only people do not all understand the
same thing by merit.
Id.
9. Id. at 147. Aristotle explained corrective justice as "the mean between
profit and loss." Id. He further explained:
It is when the whole is equally divided into two segments that people
are said to have what belongs to them, as having received an equal
amount. This equal amount is an arithmetical mean between the
greater and the smaller lines. This is in fact the reason why it is called
"just", because the division is just and equal one.
Id. at 147-48.
10. Aristotle explained the application of distributive justice:
It is justice which entitles the just man to be regarded as capable of
deliberately effecting what is just, and of making a distribution
whether between himself and somebody else, or between two other peo-
ple, not in such a way as to give himself too large, and his neighbor too
small a share of what is desirable, and conversely to give himself too
small and his neighbour too large a share of what is injurious, but to
give both himself and his neighbour such a share as is proportionately
equal, and to do the same when the distribution is between other
people.
Id. at 155-56.
11. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
12. Id. at 188-93. Professor Finnis introduced his illustration of how mod-
ern bankruptcy law reflects Aristotelian notions ofjustice with a comprehensive
description and explanation of Aristotle's definition of general and particular
justice as well as the definitions of justice by other philosophers including Saint
Thomas Aquinas. Id. at 161-88.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The task undertaken in this article will be to consider
how well modern bankruptcy law measures up to concepts of
justice that have evolved from Catholic social thought. The
application of Catholic social justice in the assessment of
whether a law is "just" or "unjust" can be viewed as a rational
progression in evaluating the quality of justice achieved
under a law.
The teachings of social justice espoused by the Catholic
Church are heavily influenced by the writings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas, 13 which, in turn, were derived from Aris-
totle's work on justice and seasoned with moral virtues of
mercy and charity. By introducing Catholic social justice as a
barometer for measuring the extent and quality of justice
provided under a secular law such as bankruptcy, one is chal-
lenged to consider the extent to which a society benefits from
the influences of nonsecular values and ethics in the legisla-
tive evolution of all of its secular laws. Because the nonsecu-
lar values and ethics that are the subject of this article are
derived from modern Catholic social thought, this article will
discuss briefly the concept of justice fashioned by Saint
Thomas' Summa Theological4 and selected teachings from
the Catholic Church on social justice expressed in several of
the papal encyclicals beginning with Pope Leo XIII's Rerum
Novarum. 15
Next, this article discusses Professor Finnis' analysis of
how modern bankruptcy law satisfies the Aristotelian con-
cepts of justice, and assesses the extent to which modern
bankruptcy law reflects the values articulated under the the-
ory of social justice that has evolved from modern Catholic
social teachings. As noted above, a correlative objective of
this article is to stimulate an appreciation of the value of
measuring the justice achieved under secular laws against
nonsecular concepts of justice. This article concludes that
such morally inspired standards of justice demand a higher
level of justice from the laws enacted to govern and provide
for the common good of our communities.
13. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, in THE POLITICAL
IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 105, question 58 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953).
14. Id.
15. POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (1891), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 14 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A.
Shannon eds., 1992).
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II. JUSTICE AND THE TRADITION OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT
The teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas provide a frame-
work of concepts that guide Catholic social thought, and are,
therefore, indispensable to one's appreciation of Catholic so-
cial justice. In his discussion of justice in Summa Theo-
logica,16 Saint Thomas defended and supported Aristotle's
concept of general justice as being "complete virtue," whereby
one acts for the common good of others. According to Saint
Thomas:
Justice . . . directs man in his relations with other
men.... It follows, therefore, that the good of any virtue,
whether such virtue directs man in relation to himself or
in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable
to the common good to which justice directs; so that all
acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs
man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is
called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to
direct to the common good,... it follows that the justice
which is in this way styled general, is called "legal jus-
tice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law
which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common
good. 17
Although Saint Thomas followed Aristotle's concept of
general justice, he suggested that other moral virtues such as
mercy and charity further define the meaning of justice. He
explained that these virtues are secondary to justice because
of their connection to justice. That is, "to succor the needy,
which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent,
which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction
ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue."18 Accordingly,
those who are blessed with abundance have that which they
need and what is due them, but should be moved to share
their abundance with the needy for the common good of soci-
ety. From Saint Thomas' theory of justice as a "complete vir-
tue," which is directed to achieve a common good for all, and
seasoned by higher virtues of mercy and charity, we find the
formative and guiding influences of social justice as evolved
from Catholic social thought.
16. AQuINAs, supra note 13, at 105.
17. Id. at 113-14.
18. Id. at 124.
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The encyclicals issued by Catholic Church leaders during
the last century have consistently reflected a concept of social
justice that is infused with the virtues of mercy and charity
as proper responses to the unjust treatment and sufferings of
mankind throughout society. These same statements from
the church on social justice have been criticized by some as
being "too idealistic" and by others as failing "to preserve [the
church's] prophetic integrity."' 9 To the contrary, the church's
willingness to apply these ideals to real social controversy
has made Catholic social teaching a credible witness. As
stated in one commentary:
[I]t is precisely the effort to be both prophetic and re-
sponsible that distinguishes Catholic social teaching and
makes it so significant in the modern world. The church
as a whole is trying to be both idealistic and realistic be-
cause that is what it is called to be, and it is what all per-
sons must try to be if humanity is to overcome its appar-
ently insurmountable problems. To put it most simply, if
men and women do not believe that it is possible to live in
justice and peace, they will slip ever deeper into a fatalism
that only confirms the drift of events toward greater
tragedy.20
Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum is regarded as the pri-
mal writing on modern Catholic social thought, the encyclical
that all subsequent pontiffs have followed and celebrated as
the foundation of Catholic social doctrine. Although it was
written in 1891, against the backdrop of the European Indus-
trial Revolution, its message remains timeless.2'
19. CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 5 (David J.
O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
20. Id.
21. See Pope Pius XI's Quadragesimo Anno for a discussion of the impact of
the Rerum Novarum on society. POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 42
(David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992). Pope Pius described the
long term effect that Pope Leo's Rerum Novarum had on law and society:
As a result of these steady and tireless efforts, there has arisen a new
branch of jurisprudence unknown to earlier times, whose aim is the
energetic defense of those sacred rights of the workingman which pro-
ceed from his dignity as a man and as a Christian. These laws concern
the soul, the health, the strength, the housing workshops, wages, dan-
gerous employments, in a word all that concerns the wage earners,
with particular regard to women and children. Even though these reg-
ulations do not agree always and in every detail with the recommenda-
tions of Pope Leo, it is none the less certain that much which they con-
tain is strongly suggestive of Rerum Novarum, to which in large
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On the fortieth anniversary of the Rerum Novarum, Pope
Pius XI credited Pope Leo's teachings as being a catalyst for
many of the laws that reformed the deplorable social condi-
tions of the Industrial Revolution, for transcending non-Cath-
olic communities, and for hitting a cord with "legislative as-
semblies and in courts of justice."22 According to Pope Pius,
the Rerum Novarum "prevailed" on its readers to affect social
policy and to give assistance to legislators so that they might
affect legislative bodies as "advocates of the new [social] pol-
icy" in reflecting the teachings of Pope Leo.23
When Pope John Paul celebrated the centennial anniver-
sary of the Rerum Novarum in 1991, he provided a striking
reminder of the historical backdrop against which the Rerum
Novarum was written and to which its message responded.
In his letter, Centesimus Annus,24 Pope John Paul noted that
the late 1800s were a historical challenge for all, including
the church, as it observed an Industrial Revolution that
brought with it radical improvements and efficiencies in sci-
ence and technology.25 These advances brought forth a
newer, more progressive and prosperous mercantilism and
consumerism, which affected not only the world economy, but
also its politics. 2 6 Although these changes brought "hope of
new freedoms" to society, they also brought "the threat of new
forms of injustice and servitude."27 Because of the new ad-
vancements in science and technology, the manufacturing
processes became more efficient and less dependent on labor.
Accordingly, the cost of labor was reduced, resulting in a re-
duction in the bargaining power of labor in the market place,
and making wages insufficient to support the average
worker.28
measure must be attributed the improved condition of the
workingmen.
Id. at 47-48, para. 28.
22. Id. at 46, para. 21.
23. Id. at 47, para. 27.
24. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS (1991), reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 439 (David J. O'Brien &
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
25. Id. at 441-47.
26. Id. at 441-42.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 441-42. In his account of the impact that the Industrial Revolu-
tion had on society and the significance of the Rerum Novarum at that time,
Pope John Paul stated:
1996] 1031
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In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo addressed the prevailing
poverty found throughout Europe and the deplorable labor
conditions of the working class. Pope Leo defined the role of
the church in responding to the social crises of the time: to
instill virtues in men and women that would enable them to
combat the effects of both earthly and spiritual poverty. He
stated that if virtues of morality are "adequately and com-
pletely practiced" they can satisfy both "spiritual" and
"earthly" needs.29 In the words of Pope Leo, the practice of
such values
powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of
pleasure - twin plagues, which too often make a man
without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abun-
dance; it makes men supply by economy for the want of
means, teaching them to be content with frugal living and
keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up
not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissi-
pate many a goodly inheritance.30
It is perhaps with these words that one might character-
ize Pope Leo's comments on the mission of the church to arm
humanity with values to fight the temptations of the tempo-
ral world - temptations that might lead to spiritual and fi-
nancial bankruptcy - as being simple and hopelessly idealis-
tic. The church's concern with the moral health of men and
women as a part of the solution to poverty, however, made
perfect sense when tempered with Pope Leo's views on the
role of the state and what society can reasonably expect from
the state in the elimination of poverty.
The result of this transformation was a society "divided into two
classes, separated by a deep chasm." This situation was linked to the
marked change taking place in the political order .... Thus the pre-
vailing political theory of the time sought to promote total economic
freedom by appropriate laws, or, conversely, by a deliberate lack of any
intervention. At the same time, another conception of property and
economic life was beginning to appear in an organized and often vio-
lent form, one which implied a new political and social structure.
At the height of this clash, when people finally began to realize
fully the very grave injustice of social realities in many places and the
danger of a revolution fanned by ideals which were then called "social-
ist," Pope Leo XIII intervened with a document which dealt in a sys-
tematic way with the "condition of the workers."
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. POPE LEO XIII, supra note 15, at 25, para. 23.
30. Id.
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According to Pope Leo, justice is not a static concern with
formal rights and duties. It is a dynamic challenge for the
state to create a just, fair, and responsible society, through
the creation and implementation of institutions and laws that
produce both "public well-being and private prosperity."31
This task can be described in terms of the concepts of justice
and the common good, as framed by Saint Thomas. In using
these concepts, Pope Leo suggested that the laws must bal-
ance the interests and entitlements of the individual mem-
bers of society against the well-being of the society as a
whole, with an expectation of contribution from the fortunate
to the less fortunate.32
By following the lead of Saint Thomas in his belief that
moral virtues play a critical role in the attainment of social
justice, Pope Leo developed further insight that distributive
justice within a society depends not only on the state but also
on individual efforts. That is, the secondary virtues of
"mercy, liberality, and the like" will guide men and women of
the community to make decisions about their economic and
social welfare that will be in their individual best interest,
but will also benefit the common good of the community in
which they live.3 3 These same just men and women will in-
fluence the shape of the laws of the state in a just way, either
directly as law makers or indirectly through the election of
those who will represent them.
31. Id. at 26, para. 26.
32. Id. at 26-27. Pope Leo stated:
To the State the interest of all are equal whether high or low. The poor
are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are
real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family,
the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the
majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens
and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must
duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and comfort of the working
people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that
each shall have his due.
Id.
33. Pope Pius offered his own perspectives on the role and interest of the
church in both the economic and social welfare of society. He stated that the
church's concern in such matters is appropriate to its "God-given task" because
of the impact that such conditions have on the "moral conduct" of its citizens.
PoPE Pius XI, supra note 21, at 51, para. 41. He noted that "economic activity
and moral discipline" are interrelated by virtue of the fact that the material
requirements that men and women deem necessary and desirable are affected
and defined by their sense of "reason," which should reflect good and sound
judgment and thus, the moral fitness of each individual. Id. at para. 42.
19961 1033
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In the Catholic tradition, just laws should reflect fairness
and responsibility to all by providing for the enforcement of
the obligation of commutative justice between individuals.
Such laws, however, must also balance the public well-being
against private prosperity and reflect the common good of all
through a dynamic regard for the requirement of distributive
justice. If it is necessary for the common good of all to require
contribution and sacrifice from the more fortunate to the less
fortunate, then the laws must so provide. The law's regard
for distributive justice must include all members of society
and not be unduly preferential to one group at the expense of
another.34
Just as the papal social teachings strike a balance be-
tween idealism and realism, they also balance state action in
the pursuit of social justice with a healthy regard for the im-
portant role of "the individual, the family and society" as be-
ing primarily responsible for achieving justice.35  Accord-
ingly, as one looks to the concepts of social justice that have
evolved from the Catholic Church, it is imperative to consider
not only the role of the state in achieving justice, but also the
role of the individual in solving social problems with justice.
34. In the words of Pope Pius:
Wealth, . . .which is constantly being augmented by social and
economic progress, must be so distributed among the various individu-
als and classes of society that the common good of all, of which Leo XIII
spoke, be thereby promoted. In other words, the good of the whole
community must be safeguarded. By these principles of social justice
one class is forbidden to exclude the other from a share in the profits.
Each class, then, must receive its due *share, and the distribution
of created goods must be brought into conformity with the demands of
the common good and social justice.
Id. at 55-56, paras. 57, 58.
Pope John Paul also noted the enduring quality of Pope Leo's message re-
garding the "relationship between the state and its citizens." POPE JOHN PAUL
II, supra note 24, at 446. He recalled Pope Leo's admonition that a state must
not favor one group of citizens over another. Id. And while the words of Pope
Leo were written with the laborer in mind, they carried a truth for all kinds of
interests in relation to the state's duties to its citizens. According to Pope John
Paul, this included "namely the rich and prosperous, nor can it 'neglect the
other,' which clearly represents the majority of society.". Id.
35. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 24, at 447.
[Vol. 361034
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
JUSTICE
A. Evolving Justice Under Bankruptcy Law
Bankruptcy law is devoted to the plight of debtors who
find themselves overwhelmed by financial burdens and un-
able to meet their debt obligations. These obligations may
have been incurred by the debtor voluntarily, or they may
have been imposed on the debtor by law due to their legal
status, such as a delinquent taxpayer owing unpaid income
taxes to a local, state, or federal tax authority, or a noncus-
todial parent required by court decree to pay child support.
In any case, these debtors look to our bankruptcy law as a
source of relief from their debt obligations and the resulting
pressures their creditors force upon them in hopes of receiv-
ing some payment on long overdue debts.
Our current bankruptcy law, formally known as the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197836 and more commonly re-
ferred to as the Bankruptcy Code, is a law of equity. As a law
premised on equity and focused on balancing the interests of
all affected parties, its purpose is not only to provide relief to
the distressed debtor, but also to achieve a fair and just set-
tlement of the various creditors' claims in any property of the
debtor that is available to satisfy these claims.37 The relief
36. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
37. This notion of equity in modern bankruptcy law was observed by
Charles Warren in his book Bankruptcy in United States History. In his discus-
sion of the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code, he stated that congres-
sional power in providing for bankruptcy laws:
should not [be exercised] in the interest either of the debtor or of the
creditor class alone - and that, in fact, there could be no such division
of American citizens, since most of us are in one capacity debtors, and
in another capacity creditors. There is now, therefore, a rather general
acceptance of the principle that a bankruptcy law is required in the
public interest of the Nation at large and for its welfare, apart from the
effect of the law upon the particular individuals on whom it is to oper-
ate. Now, the chief interest of the Nation lies in the continuance of a
man's business and the conservation of his property for the benefit of
creditors and himself, and not in the sale and distribution of his assets
among his creditors, or even in his own immediate discharge from his
debts.
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 144 (1935).
Similarly, Congress emphasized equity and balance in the legislative his-
tory of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
1036 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
sought by the individual debtor is a discharge of all debts ex-
isting at the time he or she files a petition in bankruptcy. 8
The creditors from whose debts the debtor will be discharged
hope to receive some equitable share of the proceeds resulting
from the sale of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy assets, or the
bankruptcy estate9.3  This, in essence, is the justice of modern
bankruptcy law. It is a law responding to the plea for relief of
the bankrupt debtor, while resolving to treat all creditors
fairly and equitably according to their claims of financial con-
tribution from a once financially viable debtor.4 0
The overall objectives of [the Reform Act legislation] are to make bank-
ruptcy procedures more efficient, to balance more equitably the inter-
ests of different creditors, to give greater recognition to the interests of
general unsecured creditors who enjoy no priority in the distribution of
the assets of the debtor's estate, and to give the debtor a less encum-
bered "fresh start" after bankruptcy.
S. REP. No. 1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPrcV app. 3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1994).
38. This discussion of relief provided under modern bankruptcy law will be
limited to the kind of relief an individual debtor may receive in a chapter 7
liquidation. Section 726 of the Code provides that upon the liquidation of all
nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate and distribution of proceeds to the
debtor's creditors, individual debtors will receive a discharge from all pre-peti-
tion indebtedness, except for debts that are deemed nondischargeable under
section 523 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523, 726 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Individual debtors who have regular income may elect to seek relief under
chapter 13 of the Code as opposed to relief under chapter 7. Under chapter 13,
a debtor is not required to submit his or her pre-petition assets for liquidation
in order to receive a discharge. In chapter 13 cases, a debtor is required to
propose a plan to pay creditors certain prescribed minimum amounts on their
claims against the debtor over a three to five year period from their future in-
come or earnings. Because the payments to creditors are being made from the
debtor's future sources of income, the debtor is able to retain his or her pre-
petition assets and avoid liquidation. Upon completion of payments to the
debtor's creditors under the plan, the debtor will receive a discharge. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39. Under chapter 7 of the Code, the debtor will receive a discharge of all
personal liability for pre-petition indebtedness only after all creditors holding
secured claims against the bankruptcy estate have been paid the value of their
interest in the property of the estate securing their claims and after creditors
with unsecured claims have received payment of their share in any remaining
proceeds from the liquidated estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 725-727 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
40. This sense of justice is reflected in the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Act:
It has been said that a bankruptcy law would be unjust to debtors;
this is denied. It has been said that a bankruptcy law would be unjust
to creditors; this statement is equally unsound. Debtors are now liable
to their creditors for the amounts due. They would not be liable to
them on any other ground under a bankruptcy law. Creditors now
1996] MODERN BANKRUPTCY LAW 1037
Modern bankruptcy law is clearly a wondrous legislative
response to the inequities historically suffered by debtors
under early bankruptcy law. This "modern" bankruptcy law
first began to take form in England and the United States
during the latter half of the nineteenth century.41 The first
bankruptcy law enacted in England dates back to 1542.42
This law and many of the other bankruptcy laws that would
follow it lacked compassion for the plight of the bankrupt
debtor, as they often included imprisonment as a form of re-
lief for the unpaid creditor, and relegated the debtor to the
status of criminal while offering limited, if any, forgiveness of
the debtor's unpaid debts. 3
The provision for a debtor's discharge, albeit limited to
the merchant debtor, first appeared in the bankruptcy and
insolvency laws of England as early as the eighteenth cen-
tury, and in the first bankruptcy act of the United States in
have individual remedies against their debtor. Under the bankruptcy
law they would have a collective remedy, but only to the same extent.
Under present laws if a debtor is suspected of being in the throes
of financial death the creditor who happens to learn of it rushes in with
compulsory process and secures a lien on his estate - a lien as against
all of the creditors with equal rights. In this particular case it is very
advantageous for the lucky creditors, but laws which serve such a man
do not result in the greatest good to the greatest number; the bank-
ruptcy law would secure the rights of all the creditors in every case.
Again, under State laws, which is a sharp race of diligence, creditors
take chances; they strike early and mercilessly, for fear that some
other creditor may get in ahead. With the bankruptcy law proper time
can be taken for investigation, as all creditors will know that prefer-
ences will be not be sustained, and that equity must be done in the
distribution of the assets of the insolvent.
H.R. REP. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1897).
41. The bankruptcy laws of England and the United States that provide the
foundation from which the current bankruptcy laws of each country are struc-
tured were enacted in 1883 in England (46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52 (1883) (Eng.)) and
in 1898 in the United States (The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)).
For descriptions of the evolution of bankruptcy laws in England and the United
States see, PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOL-
VENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRuiPrcY, 1607-1900 (1974); WARREN,
supra note 37; Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81
COM. L.J. 226 (1976); Charles J. Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
42. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542) (Eng.).
43. For historical discussions of the bankruptcy laws of England, see gener-
ally Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the
Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, L. SCH. REC., Fall 1983, at 1; Country-
man, supra note 41; Tabb, supra note 41.
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1800."4 However, the element of imprisonment as a form of
bankruptcy relief for creditors remained present in the bank-
ruptcy laws of England until the mid-nineteenth century, 5
and could be found as a remedy available to creditors in this
country into the first half of the nineteenth century.46 The
popularity of imprisonment as an appropriate form of bank-
ruptcy relief is reflected in this popular quote from a mid-sev-
enteenth century English jurist:
If a man be taken in execution, and lie in prison for debt,
neither the plaintiff, at whose suit he is arrested, nor the
sheriff who took him, is bound to find him meat, drink, or
clothes; but he must live on his own, or on the charity of
others; and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the
name of God, says the law; and so say 1.47
The harshness of the early bankruptcy law did not reflect
the system of justice that Professor Finnis identified under
modern bankruptcy law.4 s In fact, the objectives of modern
bankruptcy law and early bankruptcy laws are markedly dif-
ferent. 49 As indicated above, early bankruptcy law placed the
44. Cohen, supra note 43, at 8-10; Countryman, supra note 41, at 228.
45. Cohen, supra note 43, at 5-6, 10-11.
46. The bankruptcy laws of Colonial America and the United States were
influenced primarily from the English system of bankruptcy law. See generally
COLEMAN, supra note 41; Countryman, supra note 41; John C. McCoid II, The
Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEVS. J. 361 (1988); Tabb, supra
note 41.
47. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 5 (quoting Justice Sir Robert H. Hyde).
48. Professor Finnis provided the following description of modern bank-
ruptcy law:
Bankruptcy is a legal process whereby someone who is insolvent
(i.e. cannot discharge his financial liabilities) is judicially declared
bankrupt, whereupon his property vests in a trustee who holds it solely
for the purpose of division amongst the bankrupt's creditors. During
bankruptcy the opportunities and rights of the bankrupt to engage in
business are severely limited. Upon satisfactory division of the prop-
erty, he may be judicially discharged from bankruptcy, whereupon he
is relieved for all further liability in respect of his former debts.
FiNsis, supra note 11, at 188.
49. One commentator described the different objectives of modern bank-
ruptcy law and the earliest English statutes governing bankruptcy as follows:
Although the modern conception of bankruptcy is rateable distribution
of the bankrupt's assets among his creditors (resulting in the discharge
of the bankrupt's obligation to pay existing debts), the original purpose
was simply to facilitate execution against a debtor. The bankruptcy
act of 1542 authorized the Chancellor and other bankruptcy commis-
sioners, on petition of the creditor, to summon the bankrupt before
them, examine the bankrupt upon his oath, and if necessary imprison
him until he forfeited his possessions. The bankrupt's estate was dis-
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condition of bankruptcy in the category of a penal offense,5 °
making the imprisonment of bankrupt debtors one form of re-
lief available to the unpaid creditor. That is, if a debtor was
in default on an obligation, the creditor could have him im-
prisoned until that creditor's debt was paid. In Professor Fin-
nis' view:
The old provisions were unsatisfactory. For they imposed
a condition of servitude upon one who might be innocent
of any contempt of law or justice. And, by allowing the
debtor to be removed, by one of his creditors, into prison
where (unlike a free man or even a slave) he could do
nothing to improve his financial position or work off his
debts, the old provisions tended to frustrate the commuta-
tively just claims of his other creditors.5 1
The disfavor and elimination of imprisonment as a form
of relief for indebtedness, in England and America, took time
and was brought about by many factors. The humanitarian
voices calling for prison reform in England during the latter
part of the eighteenth century had a great impact on the
elimination of imprisonment of debtors as the horrific and
abusive conditions of the prison system were exposed.52
Moreover, the political and social theories of the philosophers
of the time, including Jean Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson, Jer-
emy Bentham and Andrew Jackson, had tremendous influ-
tributed by the Chancellor; however, distribution did not discharge the
bankrupt's liability for claims that were not fully paid.
Cohen, supra note 43, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
50. The nature of the penal offense originated with Henry VIII:
The statutes passed by Henry VIII in 1542, which established the prin-
ciples of later bankruptcy law, were penal laws aimed solely at fraudu-
lent traders. These early bankrupts were treated as criminal offend-
ers, and commissioners were given the power to summon them for
examination, to confiscate their property, and to punish fraud. There
was no consideration given to relieving the bankrupt from his distress;
the purpose of the law was to take control of the property of the bank-
rupt on behalf of the creditors, and the bankrupt remained forever lia-
ble for his debts. For almost two hundred years these harsh laws re-
mained in effect, and were strengthened by additional statutes, such as
those passed under James I, which condemned those bankrupts who
lied under oath, or concealed property, to be pilloried and to have an
ear chopped off.
BARBARA WEISS, THE HELL OF THE ENGLISH: BANKRUPTCY AND THE VICTORIAN
NOVEL 35 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
51. FINNIS, supra note 11, at 188.
52. See IAN P. H. DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY IN LONDON DURING
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 65-68,(1985).
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ences on reforming the bankruptcy and insolvency laws in
England and America.53 One commentator summarized the
various influences as follows:
New world nationalism fed the effort to cut the ties to the
Anglo-Saxon legal heritage, especially in the common law,
and strengthened the attack on imprisonment for debt by
branding it as an Old World anachronism which had no
place in a republican society of virtuous, free men. The
Enlightenment and the French Revolution reinforced the
natural rights concept that men could not contract away
their liberty and encouraged legal simplification so as to
make law understandable to the common man. Bentham-
ism encouraged Americans to question the practicality of
traditional creditor rights, especially the power to im-
prison broken debtors.5 4
In addition to imprisonment being viewed as an inhu-
mane remedy, it proved to be ineffective and costly for the
general community.5 5 In most cases, imprisonment did not
yield a repayment of debt since it deprived the debtor of the
opportunity to earn income to repay the indebtedness; it even
added to the debtor's liability because the cost of the impris-
onment was typically assessed against the debtor.56 More-
over, the loss of the debtor as a productive contributor to the
economy as a laborer and the loss of financial support for the
debtor's dependents, making them wards of the state, were
costly aspects of the debtor's imprisonment.57 As new meth-
ods of secured financing became available to secure debt obli-
gations, and laws were created to improve the property at-
tachment and debt collection procedures for creditors, the
remedy of imprisonment became obsolete.5 8
While the reform of early bankruptcy law was slow, it is
important to note that the process came to fruition in Eng-
land and the United States in the late 1800s, near the end of
the first Industrial Revolution. This reform of bankruptcy
law shares a direct correlation with the Industrial Revolu-
tion. As one commentator noted, "the expansion of business
activity in the late eighteenth century was accompanied by a
53. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 257-58.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 249-69.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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disproportionate increase in the risks which it involved."59
For the working classes in particular, the low wages and ir-
regular employment commonly experienced during this time
"were responsible for the constant indebtedness of the lower
classes and their susceptibility to imprisonment for debt."
60
As noted above, the Industrial Revolution not only brought
forth dramatic improvements and efficiencies for industry, it
also resulted in devastating working and living conditions for
the working classes. These inequities prompted impassioned
demands for labor and social reform from secular voices, as
well as nonsecular voices like that of Pope Leo in his inspira-
tional Rerum Novarum.6'
The modern bankruptcy laws limited the injustices of the
old bankruptcy laws in several ways. The most important
improvement was the elimination of imprisonment as a form
of relief for the creditors of a bankrupt debtor. Another im-
provement found in modern bankruptcy law was the debtor's
ability to receive a discharge of personal liability from pre-
bankruptcy debts, giving the debtor a second chance, or what
is commonly referred to as a "fresh start."6 2 An improvement
that is equally important from the perspective of the creditors
is that the debtor's pre-petition property vests in the trustee
for equitable distribution among all of the debtor's
creditors. 3
59. DUFFY, supra note 52, at 2.
60. Id.
61. As noted earlier, Pope Leo XIII issued the Rerum Novarum in 1891 dur-
ing the latter years of the first Industrial Revolution. See supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text.
62. As stated in the legislative history of the Code, the debtor's ability to
receive a general discharge for all pre-petition indebtedness is "the heart of the
fresh start" under bankruptcy law. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1977), reprinted in COLLIER ON.BANKRUPTCY app. 2 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1994); see also supra note 38.
63. See supra note 38. Professor Finnis noted that modern bankruptcy law
permits all creditors to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding and recognizes
the priorities creditors enjoy under nonapplicable bankruptcy law as well as
bankruptcy law, which reflects commutative and distributive justice under the
law. Specifically, he noted that
bankruptcy law both gives effect to the commutatively just claims of
the insolvent's creditors and at the same time subjects all those claims
to a principle of distributive justice. Without a law of bankruptcy, and
indeed before the provisions of such law are applied to a particular
debtor, each of his creditors is entitled to satisfy the whole of his claim
from the whole of the debtor's property, regardless of the claims of any
other creditor. Bankruptcy law pools all the claims, and treats the
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What modern bankruptcy law now reflects is justice for
the common good. It considers the well-being of all members
of society regardless of their economic circumstances,64 and
follows Saint Thomas' extension of mercy and charity to all.65
These improvements in bankruptcy law can also be under-
stood as an expression of distributive justice as framed by
Saint Thomas, and the distribution of wealth between the
haves and have-nots suggested by Pope Leo.66 We will see
from the following discussion that by asking for adjustments
from creditors, the various rules of modern bankruptcy law
require creditors to sacrifice part of their claims to the deserv-
ing debtor through the debtor's discharge and to other credi-
tors through a ratable distribution of assets between simi-
larly situated creditors. Such sacrifice reflects contribution
by a debtor's creditors to a distributively just society.
debtor's property as if it were now the common property of the credi-
tors (put technically, the legal ownership vests in the trustee in bank-
ruptcy but the beneficial interest vests in the creditors in common, sub-
ject to a division according to law by the trustee).
FiNNis supra note 11, at 188-89.
The commutatively just result under bankruptcy law that permits all credi-
tors to share in the bankruptcy estate is contrary to the remedy a creditor may
receive outside of bankruptcy, where the most efficient creditor will attempt to
foreclose against the assets of the defaulting debtor before the debtor's other
creditors. Such swift action on the part of such a creditor is likely to exhaust all
of the debtor's property to the extent that other creditors will not be able to
receive any payment due on their debts.
Some of the early bankruptcy or insolvency laws did not reflect commuta-
tive justice because they did not include all creditors in the distribution of pro-
ceeds from the estate. For example, under English law and some colonial laws,
the remedy of imprisonment often had the effect of permitting the creditor who
sought a mesne proceeding against the debtor to have the debtor imprisoned
until full payment of the debt was made, which in most cases exasperated the
debtor's financial condition and left no assets to pay the claims of the debtor's
other creditors. See COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 6-15; DUFFY, supra note 52, at
96-105.
64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
65. In a comparative study of bankruptcy and insolvency laws in European
countries written in 1893, S. Whitney Dunscomb, Jr. described the debtor's
ability to receive a discharge under English bankruptcy law, which then was
unique to English law, as evidence that "the English legislature ha[d] bowed in
recognition to a higher law and ha[d] let 'mercy season justice.'" 2 S. WHITNEY
DUNSCOMB, JR., BANKRuPTcY: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 94 (AMS
Press, Inc. 1969) (1893).
66. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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B. Bankruptcy Law and the Aristotelian Notion of Justice
In Professor Finnis' illustration of modern bankruptcy
law as an example of justice, he identified specific rules that
demonstrate how bankruptcy is concerned with general jus-
tice, as well as how these rules reflect both distributive and
commutative justice. 7 Professor Finnis based his examples
of justice on concepts framed by Aristotle and other
philosophers.68
In brief, Professor Finnis noted that general justice is
whatever is best for the community.6 9 Included in the con-
cept of general justice is distributive justice, ° which typically
anticipates distribution of limited resources between individ-
uals based on "what is due to a person in the circumstances in
which he is."7 ' Limited resources include such things as the
assets of the bankruptcy estate. The great challenge in
achieving distributive justice is determining "to whom and on
what conditions to make [the] necessary appropriation" of the
distribution of assets.72 On the subject of commutative jus-
tice, Professor Finnis underscored that with this type of jus-
tice, one is concerned with correcting or rectifying "inequali-
ties which arise in dealings . . . between individuals."73
Commutative justice, therefore, demands that individuals
have respect for the rights of others in their dealings with
each other, and is designed to rectify any inequalities, such as
"abuses, exploit[ation], or 'free-rides'" by the debtor in his or
her relationships with others.7 4 In any case, the application
of both types of particular justice must be done for the com-
mon good of the community.
As noted above, modern bankruptcy law provides that all
creditors of the bankrupt debtor may file proof of claims
against the bankruptcy estate and share in the proceeds re-
sulting from the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate accord-
67. FiNNis, supra note 11, at 188-93. Although the rules of bankruptcy law
discussed by Professor Finnis are based on English law, identical rules of law
are found under the Bankruptcy Code.
68. Id. at 164-84.
69. Id. at 164-65.
70. Id. at 166-73.
71. Id. at 170.
72. Id. at 167.
73. Id. at 178.
74. Id. at 184.
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ing to the rules of asset distribution under the Code.75 This
opportunity for equitable participation for all creditors of the
bankrupt debtor is unlike nonbankruptcy creditor remedies,
which permit the quickest creditor to attach and liquidate all
of the available assets of a defaulting debtor to pay his or her
particular obligation, with little regard for the claims of other
creditors of the debtor. This is an example of commutative
justice in bankruptcy law in that all creditors who have pro-
vided some form of financing or credit to the debtor, or who
have other types of monetary claims against the debtor, may
have their claims addressed in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Equitable participation is accomplished when each credi-
tor with a valid claim against the debtor participates in the
bankruptcy proceeding and enjoys an opportunity to share in
the proceeds available for the payment of creditor claims.
This right of all creditors to participate in the bankruptcy
proceeding is protected under the Code through the require-
ment that the debtor making a petition for bankruptcy relief
file schedules listing all creditors with claims against the
debtor at the time of the petition.7 6 These creditors then will
receive notice of the bankruptcy petition and of their right to
file a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate.77 The
debtor's failure to include a creditor in the schedule may re-
sult in the debtor not receiving a discharge of the debt owed
to the unlisted creditor.7 8
The bankruptcy rules governing the distribution of pro-
ceeds received from the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate
recognize the rules of priority between creditors as provided
for under nonbankruptcy law, as well as special priority rules
of distribution provided under the Bankruptcy Code. These
rules, according to Professor Finnis, can also be analyzed in
relation to concepts of general justice, reflecting a delicate
75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 725, 726 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
76. In all petitions for relief under the Code, whether the petition is for
chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13, debtors are required to file a list of creditors under
§ 521. Id. § 521.
77. Id. § 501.
78. Section 523(a)(3) of the Code provides that a discharge will not be
granted to an individual debtor filing a petition for relief under any of the sev-
eral chapters of the Code for a debt that was not listed nor scheduled pursuant
to § 521 if the creditor was known to the debtor, so as to preclude the creditor
from being able to file a timely proof of claim or a timely request for a determi-
nation of nondischargeability by the court as required under the Code. Id.
§ 523(a)(3)(A)-(B).
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balance between distributive justice and commutative justice
- a requirement that is also reflective of Catholic social
teaching.79 For example, creditors whose pre-petition claims
are secured by specific assets of the bankruptcy estate are en-
titled to receive the value of their secured claims from the
proceeds of the estate before any monies are distributed to
unsecured claimants.8 0 This is the Code's recognition of the
priority secured creditors have over other creditors of the
debtor pursuant to nonbankruptcy law."' This rule of asset
distribution permits secured creditors to receive what is due
to them based on priorities they have over competing credi-
tors. This is an example of distributive justice. That is, the
condition upon which to make the "necessary appropriation"
in the distribution of the assets is based on the amount of the
secured creditors' pre-bankruptcy contributions to the
debtor's estate and the rights of priority enjoyed by the se-
cured creditors over other creditors of the debtor under
nonbankruptcy law.8 2
It is not until after all the secured claims have been paid
from the proceeds of the liquidated estate that any remaining
assets will be distributed to unsecured creditors of the
debtor.8 Within the group of unsecured claims, statutory
provisions prefer certain unsecured claims over others based
on principles of equity and public policy, which require that
these preferred claimants receive some share in the proceeds
of the estate before all other general unsecured claims are
satisfied. 4 A typical unsecured claim receiving priority in an
79. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
81. The types of nonbankruptcy priorities recognized in the distribution of
assets include the claims of creditors against a debtor's personal property or
real property that have been secured and perfected under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code or local real estate law, respectively; judgment liens
granted by a court of law pursuant to secure a default judgment against a
debtor; and liens that are imposed against a debtor's property by virtue of a
statute to secure claims against the debtor on behalf of a protected creditor,
except where the lien secures a fine or penalty or is a tax lien as provided under
section 724 of the Code. Id. § 724.
82. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
Professor Finnis' notion of "justice."
83. 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
84. The first group of unsecured claims to be paid after the payment of se-
cured claims, if there are proceeds remaining, are listed under § 507 of the
Code. These claims are known as "priority claims" and must be paid according
to the order in which they are listed. Id. §§ 507, 726(a)(1).
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individual bankruptcy case might include the unpaid wage
claims of employees of the debtor, 5 outstanding child support
or alimony payments,8 6 or outstanding tax claims due a gov-
ernment taxing authority.
This enjoyment of special priorities among unsecured
creditors in the distribution of proceeds is illustrative of the
balance between distributive and commutative justice which
is sought to achieve general justice. Equitable and public pol-
icy considerations require that certain unsecured claimants
be paid before other unsecured claimants in order to serve the
best interests of society. One such example is found in the
priority enjoyed by an employee's unpaid wage claim against
a bankrupt debtor. Because the bankrupt debtor is most
likely the only source of income for the employee, he or she is
given priority over the other general unsecured creditors of
the debtor.88 Conversely, other unsecured creditors, such as
lenders or trade creditors, have many other sources of income
and their economic survival is not "wholly dependent on the
debtor," as would be the case for an employee.89 Other exam-
ples of the interplay between the greater objective of achiev-
ing the common good of society and the need to allow each
claimant to share in the distribution of assets are the special
priorities accorded for alimony and child support claims and
governmental tax claims.9 0
85. Id. § 507(a)(3).
86. Id. § 507(a)(7).
87. Id. § 507(a)(8).
88. Id. § 507(a)(3). This special priority rule was included under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the predecessor of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress stated when en-
acting the Bankruptcy Act that "[tihe debts to have priority... and to be paid in
full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be... wages due to
workmen, clerks, or servants which have been earned within three months
before the date of the commencement of proceedings." H.R. REP. No. 65, supra
note 40, at 22.
An identical rule of bankruptcy law is found under modern English bank-
ruptcy law:
The law recognizes the similar need of those who were presumably
wholly dependent on the debtor for their livelihood; high in the list of
preferential claims, which must be satisfied in full before further divi-
sion of the pooled assets, are the wages or salaries of the debtor's
"clerks or servants, labourers or workmen," earned during the four
months before bankruptcy.
FiNis, supra note 11, at 189.
89. FiNNis, supra note 11, at 189.
90. Id. at 189-90.
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Another example of general justice identified by Profes-
sor Finnis is the limit on the debtor's ability to receive a dis-
charge of indebtedness when the debtor has come into bank-
ruptcy with clean hands and is deserving of relief.91 As
Professor Finnis noted, "the law of bankruptcy itself can be
made the instrument of injustice, above all by the bankrupt
himself.... No system of law can secure justice if its sub-
jects, let alone its officials, are themselves careless of jus-
tice."92 Accordingly, to receive a bankruptcy discharge: (1)
the debtor must not attempt to hide or conceal assets from
the bankruptcy estate;93 (2) the debtor's financial records
must be complete so that his or her financial condition can be
ascertained by all interested parties;9 4 (3) the debtor must file
a petition that is truthful in describing the debtor's financial
affairs;95 (4) the debtor must be able to explain adequately
the loss of assets held by the debtor immediately before bank-
ruptcy;96 and (5) the debtor may not refuse to testify in a
bankruptcy court proceeding after having been granted im-
munity or improperly invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination.9 7 Under these rules, bankruptcy law provides a
remedy against the debtor who has attempted to "abuse" or
"exploit" the bankruptcy process at the expense of his credi-
tors by denying the debtor a discharge.9 This reflects com-
mutative justice and its concern with correcting or rectifying
wrongs committed in dealings between individuals.99
Even in cases in which the debtor will receive a general
discharge from his debts, certain types of debts will not be
91. Under § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's right to a discharge
is conditioned upon the debtor not having been found to be in violation of the
enumerated misconduct listed thereunder. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)-(6) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Although the history of discharge under bankruptcy law em-
phasizes that the discharge of the debtor was a secondary goal under bank-
ruptcy law and the equitable distribution of assets among the debtor's creditors
was the primary purpose of the law, the debtor's ability to receive a discharge
enjoys equal importance. For a historical discussion of the role of discharge in
bankruptcy legislation, see 1A COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy 14.01[6] (James W.
Moore ed., 14th ed. 1978).
92. FINNIS, supra note 11, at 191.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. Id. § 727(a)(3).
95. Id. § 727(a)(4).
96. Id. § 727(a)(5).
97. Id. § 727(a)(6).
98. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
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discharged under any circumstances.100 The rules governing
nondischargeable debts reflect an application of commutative
justice because the more compelling interests of individual
creditors holding qualifying claims against the debtor over-
ride the debtor's need for a discharge from the debt. These
types of debt include liabilities the debtor has incurred
through wrongful conduct, or the discharge of a particular
debt which would impose an undue burden upon a particu-
larly deserving claimant or society as a whole. They also in-
clude claims based on unpaid tax liabilities;10 1 claims the
debtor inexcusably fails to list in the bankruptcy petition,
thus preventing the claimant from filing a proof of claim to
participate in the distribution of proceeds with other credi-
tors;102 claims arising from an outstanding alimony or child
support obligation; 10 3 claims against the debtor based on in-
juries the debtor has inflicted upon another due to the
debtor's "willful and malicious" conduct;10 4 unpaid guaran-
teed student loans; 10 5 and claims the debtor has incurred for
injuries inflicted upon another in the unlawful operation of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated.
10 6
Each of the illustrations governing asset distribution be-
tween creditors and the debtor's limited right to a discharge
of indebtedness demonstrate that bankruptcy law reflects the
Aristotelian concepts of justice. The rules of bankruptcy law
seek to achieve justice for the common good of society through
a balancing of the interests and rights of all individuals af-
fected by the bankruptcy of a debtor in a distributively and
commutatively just way. The fact that modern bankruptcy
law can be analyzed in the formal terms of justice used by
Aristotle, however, should not serve as a distraction from the
possibility that some of the rules of modern bankruptcy law
may be defective in terms of achieving notions of social justice
that have evolved from Catholic social teachings.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These debts include those
listed under section 523(a) of the Code. See infra notes 101-06 and accompany-
ing text.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. Id. § 523(a)(3).
103. Id. § 523(a)(5).
104. Id. § 523(a)(6).
105. Id. § 523(a)(8).
106. Id. § 523(a)(9).
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C. Bankruptcy Law and Catholic Social Thought
According to Catholic social justice, the state must enact
laws that reflect the common good of society as a whole,
meaning it must avoid enacting laws that unjustly favor the
interest of one group of society to the detriment of others.
10 7
Thus, when enacting bankruptcy legislation, Congress must
be mindful of the general welfare of the community of individ-
uals that will be affected by bankruptcy laws. This commu-
nity of individuals includes the debtor seeking bankruptcy re-
lief and the opportunity for a fresh start, as well as all of the
creditors of the debtor who hope to receive some payment on
their outstanding claims. Such creditors include secured and
unsecured creditors; creditors who have made financial con-
tributions, such as loans or credit extensions, to a once finan-
cially viable debtor; and creditors who have monetary claims
against the debtor based on certain legal rights, such as tax
claims, alimony and child support obligations, or claims for
outstanding legal judgments against the debtor.
As Pope Leo indicated in Rerum Novarum, when imple-
menting and creating laws, the state must be mindful that
"the interests of all are equal whether high or low... [and]
[i]t would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens
and to favor another." 08 Pope Pius echoed this message, not-
ing that there must be a distribution of wealth among all of
the "individuals and classes of society" in order to achieve
common good for all and social justice.10 9
Accordingly, such laws must balance the interest of all
groups affected by the debtor's bankruptcy. The interest of
the deserving debtor in getting a "fresh start" and to be re-
lieved of the financial burdens that led to the debtor's bank-
ruptcy must be justly balanced against the interest of all
creditors to share in whatever proceeds will result from the
liquidation of the bankruptcy estate. In fact, when one looks
more closely at certain bankruptcy rules governing asset dis-
tribution and the nondischargeability of debts, there is room
for argument that some of these provisions are lacking when
measured against Catholic social justice, which calls for the
state to enact laws for the common good of society as a whole
107. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
108. POPE LEO XIII, supra note 15, at 26-27.
109. POPE Pius XI, supra note 21, at 55, paras. 57, 58; see supra note 34.
10491996]
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and to avoid the enactment of laws that prefer one interest
group to the detriment of others.
For example, one of the most effective interest groups in
influencing bankruptcy legislation has been the United
States Government. The United States Government has
been successful in lobbying for the enactment of provisions
that not only prohibit the discharge of outstanding tax claims
against bankrupt debtors, 110 but also acquiring a priority sta-
tus in the distribution of proceeds for certain unsecured tax
claims. 1 ' Some commentators have argued that such treat-
ment of unpaid tax obligations is warranted in the interest of
the public welfare to require all citizens to contribute to the
community by paying their share of the tax burden and not
permitting debtors to escape such liability by going into bank-
ruptcy.112 It is questionable, however, whether permitting
110. Tax liabilities of the debtor that are nondischargeable include tax obli-
gations: (1) that enjoy priority status under § 507(a)(8) of the Code; (2) for
which the debtor was required to file a tax return but failed to file; (3) for which
the debtor was found to have filed a fraudulent return or to have willfully at-
tempted to evade or defeat such tax liability; and (4) that were filed late, yet
filed within two years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The special status granted to tax liability under bankruptcy laws also is
illustrated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. Pursuant to the Act, Con-
gress recently amended the Code so that outstanding loans obtained from third-
party lenders to pay tax obligations owed to the United States Government now
qualify as nondischargeable debts for the benefit of the third-party lender. Pub.
L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523).
The effect of this amendment enhances a debtor's ability to pay their federal
taxes with credit cards. This also benefits the United States Government by
making such financing to taxpayers more palatable from the perspective of
credit card issuers. See 140 CONG. REC. H10,769 (Oct. 4, 1994).
111. The tax obligations that are both nondischargeable and enjoy priority
status are the unsecured tax obligations described under § 507(a)(8) of the
Code. For the most part they include recent tax liabilities including: income
tax liabilities for which a return was due any time after three years before the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition; income taxes assessed within 240
days of the filing of the petition; property taxes assessed before the petition and
last due without penalty within one year of the filing of the petition; the trust
fund taxes an employer is required to collect or withhold from employees for
social security or income taxes; and excise taxes, such as sales taxes, due on
transactions occurring within three years prior to the date of the filing of the
petition. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
112. The House Report to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 discussing the
priority and nondischargeability of tax obligations explained that "[an open-
ended dischargeability policy would provide an opportunity for tax evasion
through bankruptcy, by permitting discharge of tax debts before a taxing au-
thority has an opportunity to collect any taxes due." The House Report further
noted that "[t]he priority is tied to this nondischargeability provision, in order
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the taxing authority to have the benefit of both a nondis-
chargeable debt as well as priority status in the distribution
of proceeds over other unsecured claims is for the common
good of all individuals affected by the debtor's bankruptcy.1 13
to aid the debtor's fresh start. By granting the nondischargeable tax a priority,
more of it will be paid in the bankruptcy case, leaving less of a debt for the
debtor after the case." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 62, at 190.
113. Prior to 1966, all taxes that were due a government were subject to pri-
ority status and deemed nondischargeable under bankruptcy law. With the
1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, Congress changed the law so that
only nondischargeable tax claims becoming due within three years of the filing
of the petition for bankruptcy relief received priority status. The Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws recommended these limitations. As expected, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury "resisted" them. The Commission was concerned, how-
ever, about justifying the special priority for tax claims and reflected this con-
cern in its report to Congress in 1973. The Report stated that "the
Congressional policy decision that the recognition of priority for an accumula-
tion of'stale' taxes is unfair to general creditors." REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE
BANKRuPrcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 215-17 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy app. 2, at pt. 1 (Law-
rence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1994).
Moreover, Congress recognized that a rule permitting all outstanding tax
debts to be nondischargeable, without any limit as to the age of such debt, could
hinder the debtor's ability to receive a fresh start. The 1966 House Report
explains:
Frequently, [nondischargeability of taxes] prevents an honest but
financially unfortunate debtor from making a fresh start unburdened
by what may be an overwhelming liability for accumulated taxes. The
large proportion of individual and commercial income now consumed
by various taxes makes the problem especially acute. Furthermore,
the nondischargeability feature of the law operates in a manner which
is unfairly discriminatory against the private individual or the unin-
corporated small businessman. Although a corporate bankrupt is theo-
retically not discharged, the corporation normally ceases to exist upon
bankruptcy and unsatisfied tax claims, as well as all other unsatisfied
claims, are without further recourse even though the enterprise may
continue in a new corporate form.
The committee believes, therefore, that consistency with the
rehabilitory purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as fairness to indi-
viduals demands some time limit upon the extent of taxes excepted
from discharge.
COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy app. 1, at 1579 (James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1978)
(alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1966)); see also id. 17.01[3.2]; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRup' Tc 507.01 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1994).
Professor Finnis also noted the question concerning the reasonableness of
the bankruptcy rules governing outstanding tax liabilities and how they best
serve the Aristotelian rules ofjustice: "[T]he English law of bankruptcy applies
principles ofjustice in ways which are reasonable but not necessarily or always
the only reasonable, or even most reasonable, amongst possible ways. Doubts
have reasonably, if not compellingly, been raised about, for example, the prior-
ity accorded to claims to unpaid taxes .... " FINNIS, supra note 11, at 190.
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By making the tax obligation nondischargeable, bank-
ruptcy law achieves the objective of making all debtors ac-
countable to the community pay a share of the tax burden.
The shared tax burden finances the services that all members
of the community enjoy. All must contribute to the support of
these services if the government is to be able to respond to
and promote social welfare. This reflects the notion of justice
that the law should serve the common good of society as a
whole. It also reflects a balancing of the interest of the indi-
vidual debtor seeking discharge and what is in the best inter-
est of the community.
It is clear that the nondischargeability of such a debt is a
hardship for the debtor, in that the debtor will remain per-
sonally liable to the government on the tax obligation after
the bankruptcy case is closed. In effect, this will reduce the
benefits of the "fresh start" the debtor hoped to obtain by
seeking bankruptcy relief. Congress reasoned, however, that
the priority status enjoyed by such nondischargeable tax obli-
gations lessens the burden of distribution, because such debts
are paid before general unsecured debts are paid.114
Yet, when one is reminded that general unsecured credi-
tors also are affected by the debtor's bankruptcy, the special
priority enjoyed by tax obligations over other general un-
secured claims in the distribution of assets does not seem as
justified. This is particularly poignant given the fact that tax
obligations also enjoy a nondischargeable status. As noted
above, one of the fundamental objectives of modern bank-
ruptcy law is to permit all creditors to share in the proceeds
of the bankruptcy estate. This goal will have little chance of
success when outstanding tax claims are paid before other
general unsecured claims. That is, if the tax claims exceed
the amount of proceeds from the bankruptcy estate liquida-
tion, then no proceeds will be available for distribution to the
remaining unsecured claims.
The arguments made to justify giving the tax claimant
this priority over other unsecured claims are not as compel-
ling as the arguments made for the distribution priorities en-
joyed by alimony and child support claims, or wage claims of
the bankrupt debtor's employees. In these cases, the claim-
ants are affected more directly by the debtor's bankruptcy be-
114. See supra note 112.
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cause the debtor is the major, if not the only source of their
income. These claimants are some of the most vulnerable un-
secured creditors of the bankrupt debtor. Unquestionably,
they deserve a priority over other general unsecured creditors
who are less dependent on payments from one particular
debtor, as in the case of a government tax authority. More-
over, the fact that the tax obligation is nondischargeable
makes the priority status in distribution of proceeds less com-
pelling and more evident of overreaching by the government
taxing authorities. One might argue that it is an unjustifi-
ably preferential rule of law.
The United States Government is only one of several in-
terest groups who have appealed to Congress for provisions
that preserve or prefer their claims over other claims in
bankruptcy.'15 Regardless of the interest groups petitioning
Congress for some provision in their favor, it is the duty of
the state, as defined by Catholic social thought, to provide so-
ciety with just laws that do not unfairly prefer one group over
another. Such a concept of justice is important for all legisla-
tive bodies to remember when considering proposed legisla-
tion and how that legislation will best serve the communities
governed by its laws.
115. One group that has appeared before Congress to lobby for the nondis-
chargeability of liabilities incurred by a debtor as a result of the debtor's unlaw-
ful operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated was Mother's Against
Drunk Driving (MADD). See Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Criminal Fines,
Restitution, and Related Liabilities Arising Out of a Debtor's Operation of a Mo-
tor Vehicle While Legally Intoxicated: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Eco-
nomic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1990) (statement of Janice Lord, National Director, Victim Services,
Mothers Against Drunk Driving).
Interest groups that have lobbied for the nondischargeability of consumer
credit card indebtedness include the American Bankers Association, the Con-
sumer Bankers Association and the American Retail Federation. These groups
were very interested in the enactment of § 523(a)(2)(C) of the Code, which cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption against the discharge of certain debts or cash
obtained by a debtor with a credit card immediately prior to filing a petition in
bankruptcy. See Oversight Hearings on Personal Bankruptcy: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 812-26 (1981-1982) (statements of A.
Thomas Small, American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers As-
sociation and Robert D. Ranck, the American Retail Federation).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Every law serves a specific purpose. Bankruptcy law is
designed to provide financial relief to the overburdened
debtor and to assure that all creditors with claims against the
debtor have an opportunity to receive their due share from
the bankruptcy estate. The greater purpose of all laws, how-
ever, must be to serve the common good of all. To the extent
that bankruptcy law addresses competing claims against an
estate that is insufficient to satisfy all claims, the competing
interests must always be balanced against the common good
of society as a whole. This often will require sacrifice or con-
tribution from one for the benefit of another; it will undoubt-
edly require mercy and liberality. As we learn from the
teachings of Saint Thomas, justice at its highest level will not
be achieved without these virtues.
Saint Thomas' theory of justice made the moral virtue of
the individual central in achieving social justice. The pontiffs
also emphasized this point. 116 For any legislative body to
carry out this notion of social justice, it is imperative that the
individual members who make up these legislative bodies
possess a character that recognizes and embraces the greater
importance of the individual's responsibility in achieving so-
cial justice. By embracing this responsibility for the attain-
ment of social justice, one can expect that the laws enacted by
these individuals will be similarly inspired by such justice.
This will require that these individuals be merciful and chari-
table to others. They must be willing to forego their own self-
interest for the common good of society, and never permit the
interest of any one group to violate justice for the rest of soci-
ety. All men and women, citizens and lawmakers alike, can
be inspired to remember and practice these higher notions of
justice by simply recalling the wise and poetic words spoken
by Portia, the lawyer in William Shakespeare's The Merchant
of Venice: "Earthly power doth show likest God's when mercy
seasons justice."11
116. See supra part II.
117. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1.
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